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Essay
"Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:" Berger v. United
States 75 Years After
Bennett L. Gershman*

I. INTRODUCTION

Seventy-five years ago, Woody Allen was born and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. died. Other notable events also occurred that year.' Italy
invaded Ethiopia; the anti-Jewish "Nuremberg Laws" went into effect in
Nazi Germany; Persia was renamed Iran; and Babe Ruth played his last
game and hit his last home run. 1935 also saw the first appearances of
Bugs Bunny, parking meters, the board game Monopoly, canned beer,
nighttime Major League Baseball, Alcoholics Anonymous, and George
Gershwin's "Porgy and Bess."
Bruno Richard Hauptmann was
convicted and sentenced to death for the kidnapping and murder of
Charles Lindbergh, Jr.; the Barker Gang was killed in a shootout with
the FBI; Huey Long, U.S. Senator from Louisiana, was shot to death in
the Louisiana Capitol in Baton Rouge; T.E. Lawrence was killed in a
motorcycle accident in Dorset, England; and Will Rogers died in a
plane crash. Also that year, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
"New Deal" to bring the nation out from the Great Depression was
energized by the passage of the Social Security Act and the creation of
the Works Progress Administration, but was dealt a stunning setback
when the nation's highest court, operating from its newly-opened
Supreme Court Building, declared the National Industrial Recovery Act
unconstitutional in A.L.A. SchechterPoultry Corp. v. United States.2

* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. Three people provided valuable assistance and
encouragement in thinking about, researching, and writing this Essay, for which I am most
grateful: Professors Lissa Griffin and Marie Newman, and Vicky Gannon. I would also like to
thank Dean Michelle Simon for her support.
1. See Today in History for Year 1935, HISTORY ORB, http://www.historyorb.com/date/1935

(last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
2. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
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Indeed, of all the noteworthy events of 1935, perhaps the most
noteworthy of all-certainly for legal academics and historians-was
the aggressive interposition of a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
against the New Deal, in the "most ambitious dragon-fight" in the
Court's history to save the nation from the dragons of "socialism" and
rescue the maidens of "free enterprise." 3 Schechter was the most
famous of several cases in the 1935 term, in which a consistent fiveJustice majority-whom FDR contended were too old to judge
effectively-tore huge holes in the New Deal.4
Interestingly, however, the Court that is remembered for
championing economic conservatism is also remembered for
remarkably progressive rulings that dramatically expanded civil rights
and personal freedoms. 5 The "Hughes Court," named for Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause the freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, and religion contained in the First Amendment. The Hughes
Court also handed down sweeping equal protection rulings that would
lay the groundwork for the landmark desegregation cases a few decades
later. In addition, the Hughes Court expanded the Bill of Rights
protections of criminal defendants to have the assistance of counsel, to
be protected against coercive methods of police interrogation to obtain
confessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and a
prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony at trial to obtain a
criminal conviction. 6
But of all the criminal procedure decisions from the Hughes Court,
and particularly cases dealing with a defendant's right to a fair trial, one
decision stands out. Indeed, courts have cited this decision so often that
it has attained a near-iconic status for its description of the prosecutor's
3. See ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 91, 110 (Sanford Levinson
ed., 3d ed. 2000) (discussing the Supreme Court's opposition to President Roosevelt's New Deal

legislation).
4. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631 (1935) (limiting the
President's power to dismiss members of federal regulatory agencies); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (striking down a statute requiring railroads and their
employees to contribute to a federally-administered pension fund); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 394 (1935) (striking down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act
permitting the President to bar interstate shipments of oil produced in excess of limits established
by oil-producing states).
5. See wILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 1930-1941,

at 172 (2007) ("[The] Hughes Court decided so many landmark civil liberties cases that scholars
have begun to believe that its record on personal liberties transformed the law as profoundly as its
'revolution' in economic cases.").
6. See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text (identifying applicable Hughes Court
decisions).
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duty to serve justice, play by the rules, and not hit below the belt. In
Berger v. United States, Justice George Sutherland, who was part of the
Schechter majority, said the following about the role of the prosecutor:
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed he should do so. But while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one. 7
Seventy-five years later, Berger's powerful rhetoric continues to
resonate. Berger's exhortation is routinely cited by courts when they
reverse a conviction resulting from a prosecutor's misconduct; by
lawyers in appellate briefs as a ritualistic incantation of the law's
commitment to fair criminal process and the prevention of wrongful
convictions; and by academics as a reminder of the appropriate ethical
standard for a prosecutor.8 Indeed, Berger's rhetoric of sportsmanship
and fair play is especially attractive in the U.S. legal and social culture
that revels in adversarial combat and glorifies feats of athletic prowess.
This is particularly apt as it applies to the image of a District Attorneya "Champion of the People"-vindicating the rule of law in a contest
against law-breakers. 9 In fact, the prosecutor described by Berger
embodies an even more heroic persona-a gladiator who is required to
play by special rules that may require him to eschew winning for the
nobler goal of serving the cause of justice. What is more heroic than
sacrificing self-interest for some higher principle?
But there is another side to this romanticized depiction of the
prosecutor's role that Berger also recognized, a darker side. Even
7. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

8. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (illustrating the continuing impact of
Berger).

9. Metaphors of sports and games are often used when describing U.S. litigation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958) (stating that one of the
objectives of rules of discovery is to make a trial "less a game of blind man's bluff and more a
fair contest"); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for

Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279 (1963) (discussing the possibility that the system has
become too much like a sporting contest); Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6 (1941) (describing qualities of a "good prosecutor" as
including "sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship").
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though Berger exhorted prosecutors to embrace good sportsmanship
and play by the rules, the prosecutor, as the Berger Court well knew,
wants very badly to win. They are armed with more and better
weaponry than the adversary; they exercise an inordinate influence over
the referee and score-keeper; and they can cheat without getting caught
or suffering any penalty.' 0 And the prosecutor's cheating costs more
than losing a game or a title; it may cost a person his liberty or his life.
Why did the Supreme Court decide to review this particular case at
this particular time? It was a tumultuous term for the Court, as well as
the country, and Berger was a run-of-the-mill federal conspiracy case
that raised no constitutional or significant federal question." Nor was
this the first case in which the Supreme Court reviewed a claim that a
prosecutor had overstepped the bounds of proper courtroom behavior. 12
Although the prosecutor did overreach, his conduct, as we shall see, was
not that different from the conduct of prosecutors generally. And even
if the Court chose to review the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct,
there were factual variables of a criminal trial to consider: the type and
extent of the prosecutor's misconduct; whether that misconduct was
invited by defense counsel; the strength of the evidence of guilt; and the
issuance of curative instructions by the trial court. As a result of such
variables, it was unlikely that the Court could fashion any clear
standards to guide appellate courts in reviewing misconduct by
prosecutors, relying instead on harmless error.
Changes in the law and the culture may have persuaded the Court to
take up the case. First, the prosecutor's unfair conduct was pervasive
and attracted the attention of courts, academics, and the media. The
Court may have seen the need to clarify the prosecutor's legal and
ethical responsibilities. Second, because the Court was aggressively
seeking to protect an individual's liberty in the marketplace from
10. See infra notes 112-15 (underscoring recent abuses and misconduct by prosecutors).
11. The case did involve a difference between the charge and the proof, but the variance did
not seem sufficiently extreme as to call for the Court's intervention. See infra note 30 and
accompanying text (stating that the Court acknowledged a variance between the indictment and
proof at trial but did not think the variance fatal).
12. The Court several years earlier had vacated convictions in several cases involving isolated
acts of misconduct by federal prosecutors. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893)
(involving an improper comment in summation on defendant's failure to call a potentially
exculpatory witness); Hall v. United States, 150 U.S. 76, 82 (1893) (finding a breach of
professional and official duty to offer proof that defendant had committed another unrelated
crime); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 70 (1893) (involving an improper comment in
summation on defendant's failure to testify). The Court also upheld a conviction notwithstanding
improper remarks by the prosecutor. See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897) ("If
every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were grounds for a reversal,
comparatively few verdicts would stand.").
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oppressive government regulations, it might have also seen a similar
interest in protecting an individual's liberty in the courtroom from
abusive conduct by prosecutors. Third, the wrongful conviction of
innocent persons was beginning to attract public attention, and the Court
may have recognized that a prosecutor's misuse of power could result
not only in an unfair trial but also an erroneous conviction-an
intolerable and unacceptable consequence. Fourth, uncertainty in the
lower courts over the proper standards and methodology for appellate
review of trial errors may have encouraged the Court to clarify the socalled harmless error rule, particularly as it applied to a prosecutor's
misconduct. In sum, the Berger Court may have believed that exposing
and remedying flagrant misconduct by one federal prosecutor might
discourage other prosecutors from violating the rules and encourage
courts to impose penalties for infractions.
II. BERGER THEN

The prosecutor's public image in 1935 was high. For example,
William Travers Jerome, New York District Attorney, was dubbed the
"Courtroom Warrior" for several popular criminal prosecutions,
including the Stanford White and William Rice murder cases. 13
Thomas E. Dewey, New York's famous "rackets-busting" Special
Prosecutor, burst onto the national scene in 1935 with his aggressive
investigations, prosecutions, and near-perfect conviction record of
notorious mobsters and other malefactors. His list of prosecutions
included gangsters Dutch Schultz and Lucky Luciano, Tammany Hall
politician James J. Hines, and New York Stock Exchange President
Richard Whitney. 14 Dewey was the inspiration for the character in the
popular radio show "Mr. District Attorney," with its memorable
opening: "Mr. District Attorney! Champion of the People! Guardian of
Our Fundamental Rights to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness!"' 5 As we shall see, however, the prosecutor's public image
as a fearless champion of justice coexisted with a strikingly different
image-a dirty fighter who wins by cheating.
To be sure, the prosecutor of Harry Berger-Henry Singer, thenChief Assistant United States Attorney in Brooklyn-did not enjoy the
13. See generally RICHARD O'CONNOR, COURTROOM WARRIOR: THE COMBATIVE CAREER
OF WILLIAM TRAVERS JEROME (1963) (reviewing several of the high-profile prosecutions led by

Jerome).
14. See RICHARD NORTON SMITH, THOMAS E. DEWEY AND His TIMES 133, 194, 249, 251

(1982) (detailing Dewey's prosecutions of the accused parties).
15. See Mr. DistrictAttorney on the Job, BIG LITTLE BOOKS, http://www.biglittlebooks.com/
distattomey.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (describing the former radio show).
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reputation of Dewey or Jerome. He was well known to court observers
as an aggressive trial lawyer. 16 Singer fought in France in World War I,
studied law, and entered private practice in Brooklyn in the 1920s
before joining the U.S. Attorney's Office. While there, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals once rebuked him for improper courtroom
conduct.17 Singer left the U.S. Attorney's Office shortly after the
Berger trial and re-entered private practice. Shortly thereafter, the state
court of New York indicted and convicted him for plotting to bribe a
juror in a high-profile murder case.18 The key testimony against Singer
was from an accomplice, whose friends Singer had sent to jail while a
federal prosecutor, which was ironic because Singer convicted Berger
Also ironically, Singer's
through an accomplice's testimony.
conviction was reversed by the appellate division, which found that the
accomplice's testimony was unbelievable and that Singer's right to a
fair trial was prejudiced by inflammatory and incompetent evidence. 19
Singer resumed his law practice and defended several prominent clients,
including Jimmy Hoffa and State Supreme Court Justice J. Vincent
Keogh. Singer is quoted as having said that the most dangerous quality
in a prosecutor is zeal: "Anyone who seeks to become a prosecutor
should be disqualified on that ground alone." 20
Singer prosecuted Berger, along with several other co-defendants, in
the federal district court in Brooklyn, New York, for conspiracy to deal
in counterfeit bank notes and possession of counterfeit notes. The
charges were based on the testimony of Jack Katz, the accomplice
described by the Second Circuit as a "thoroughly unreliable person"
with a lengthy criminal record of convictions for larceny and forgery. 2 1
Singer procured Katz's testimony in return for his promise to reduce
Katz's punishment from 122 years in prison and a $50,000 fine to two

16. See Edward Ranzal, Court Fix Trial Will Start Today: Justice Keogh and 2 Others Face

Charge of Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1962, at 23 (describing Singer as "a relentless crossexaminer").
17. See People v. Silverman, 297 N.Y.S. 449, 457-58 (App. Div. 1937) (noting Singer was
rebuked on two separate occasions for improper conduct by two courts).
18. See People v. Singer, 295 N.Y.S. 874, 882 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (supplemental opinion) (ruling
that Singer was not entitled to a new trial, as additional proof of variance in the witnesses'
testimony would not have impacted the verdict).
19. See Silverman, 297 N.Y.S. at 463, 472 (describing the difficulty for the jury to weigh
testimony and statements made by the prosecution).
20.

JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS: INSIDE THE OFFICES OF THE GOVERNMENT'S

MOST POWERFUL LAWYERS 287 (1987) (quoting Singer in a discussion of the characteristics of
prosecutors).
21. United States v. Berger, 73 F.2d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 1934), rev'd, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
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years in prison and a $10,000 fine. 22 Katz testified that he passed
counterfeit notes to two persons, Rice and Jones, with whom Berger
was not involved. 23 Katz also testified that Berger was involved in one
transaction in which Katz gave Berger a few forged bank notes that
Berger immediately gave to Jones. 24 Katz's testimony against Berger
was suspicious-he was the only witness who stated that Berger
handled counterfeit notes, and there was no corroboration of this
testimony. 25 Katz had previously expressed hostility towards Berger,
whom he suspected of romancing his wife, and he told others that
Berger had nothing to do with the forged bills. 26 Seven respected
witnesses testified to Berger's good reputation for honesty. 27 The jury
acquitted Berger of possessing forged bank notes but convicted him of
conspiracy. He was sentenced to a year and a day in the penitentiary.
Berger appealed to the Second Circuit and then to the U.S. Supreme
Court. He claimed innocence, and specifically, that Katz framed him.
He also argued that he was prejudiced by a variance between the
indictment (which charged only one conspiracy involving Katz, Rice,
Jones, and Berger) and the proof at trial (which, as noted above,
established two separate conspiracies, one of which did not involve
Berger). The Second Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that
there was a variance between the allegations in the indictment and the
proof at trial, but both held that the variance was not "fatal." 28 Both
courts also agreed that the evidence of Berger's involvement in the
conspiracy was weak. 29 Thus, given the weakness of the case against
Berger, his second contention became pivotal-that Singer's
misconduct was so pronounced and persistent that it destroyed Berger's
ability to prove his innocence before a fair and impartial tribunal.
The Second Circuit rejected Berger's misconduct claim in a single
paragraph. The court concluded that Singer's misconduct did not
impair the trial's fairness. In his opinion for the unanimous panel of
four judges, Judge Learned Hand conceded that Singer "failed in
22. See Transcript of Record at 93, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (No. 544)
[hereinafter Trial Transcript] (recording that Singer states that he would allow Katz's plea deal
and reduced punishment "[i]f [he] believed [Katz's] testimony was truthful" and that "[he] would
gauge that truthfulness").
23.

Id.

24. Id. at 149.
25. Id. at 150, 193.
26. Id. at 158-60, 193-94, 261.
27. Id. at 205-32.
28. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81 (1935); United States v. Berger, 73 F.2d 278, 280
(2d Cir. 1934), rev'd, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
29. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88-89; Berger, 73 F.2d at 279.
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moderation and good taste" and "abuse[d] his position." 30 However,
Hand said, it would be "fantastic" to conclude that the misconduct
substantially influenced the outcome. 3 1 Observing that Singer's
misconduct may have "colored the whole, as perhaps it did, and as it
was certainly intended to do," and suggesting that the trial judge was
derelict in not "keep[ing] him more closely in hand than he did," the
panel determined that any harm from Singer's misconduct was
"scarcely detect[able]." 32 Thus, "[i]n the case at bar," Hand concluded,
''we can find nothing grave enough to compromise its essential
fairness." 33
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Hand's conclusion and
reversed Berger's conviction. 34
Singer's breach of official and
professional rules, which the court below dismissed as having a
negligible impact on the verdict, was just as confidently condemned by
the Supreme Court for its "evil influence upon the jury." 35 Observing
that it would be "impossible without reading the testimony at some
length . . . to appreciate fully the extent of the misconduct," the Court,

quoting extensively from the transcript, was plainly struck by Singer's
vicious and unrelenting attack on Berger's character, particularly his
savage cross-examination. Singer's assault included insinuations that
Berger was a liar and had made statements to Singer that Berger
claimed he had not said; 36 made gratuitous insinuations that Berger had

30. Berger, 73 F.2d at 280-81.
31. Id. at 281.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Berger, 295 U.S. at 89.
35. Id. at 85.
36. The following excerpt, quoted by the Court, illustrates Singer's cross-examination of
Berger:
Q. Now Mr. Berger, do you remember yesterday when the court recessed for a few
minutes and you saw me out in the hall; do you remember that? A. I do, Mr. Singer.
Q. You talked to me out in the hall? A. I talked to you?

Q.Yes. A. No.
Q. You say you didn't say to me out in the hall yesterday, "You wait until I take the
stand and I will take care of you"? You didn't say that yesterday? A. No; I didn't, Mr.
Singer; you are lying.
Q. I am lying, you are right. You didn't say that at all? A. No.
Q. You didn't speak to me out in the hall? A. I never did speak to you outside since
this case started, except the day I was in your office, when you questioned me.
Q. I said yesterday. A. No, Mr. Singer.
Q. Do you mean that seriously? A. I said no.
Q. That never happened? A. No, Mr. Singer, it did not.
Q. You did not say that to me? A. I did not.
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engaged in immoral and wrongful behavior; 37 and made deliberately
false and inflammatory insinuations about Berger's character that were
obviously intended to mislead the jury. 3 8 Singer's summation included
improper insinuations calculated to mislead the jury39 and inflammatory
attacks on Berger's lawyer. 40 Singer's conduct included snide,
sarcastic, and damning comments about Berger and his lawyer that
likely produced considerable laughter from spectators in the courtroom
at Berger's expense. 41 After describing Singer's misconduct, the Court
Q. Of course, I have just made that up? A. What do you want me to answer you?
Q. I want you to tell me I am lying, is that so?
Id. No effort was later made to prove that Berger made any such statement. Id.
37. See Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 259-60 (recording that Singer accused Berger of
"running around his apartment with his shirt off," having several women "stay overnight," and
"indulging in whatever [he] say[s] was [his] privilege with this lady").
38. The following excerpt, quoted by the Court, illustrates Singer's effort to ridicule Berger's
character:
Q. The man who didn't have his pants on and was running around the apartment, he
wasn't there? A. No, Mr. Singer. Mr. Godby told me about this, he told me, as long as
you ask me about it, if you want it, I will tell you, he told me "If you give this man's
name out, I will give you the works."
Q. Give me the works? A. No, Mr. Godby told me that.
Q. You are going to give me the works? A. Mr. Singer, you are a gentleman, I have got
nothing against you. You are doing your duty.
[After defense counsel intervened to suggest that Singer may have misunderstood
Berger's answer, Singer continued.]
Q. Wait a minute. Are you going to give me the works? A. Mr. Singer, you are
absolutely a gentleman, in my opinion, you are doing your duty here.
Q. Thank you very much. But I am only asking you are you going to give me the
works? A. I do not give anybody such things, I never said it.
Q. All right. Then do not make the statement.
Berger, 295 U.S. at 84-85.
39. Singer at one point in his summation invited the jury to conclude that a defense witness
named Goldie Goldstein knew Berger but pretended otherwise, and this was within Singer's
personal knowledge:
Mrs. Goldie Goldstein takes the stand. She says she knows Jones, and you can bet your
bottom dollar she knew Berger. She stood right where I am now and looked at him and
was afraid to go over there, and when I waved my arm, everybody started to holler,
'Don't point at him.' You know the rules of law. Well, it is the most complicated game
in the world. I was examining a woman that I knew knew Berger and could identify
him, she was standing right here looking at him, and I couldn't say, 'Isn't that the
man?' Now, imagine that! But that is the rules of the game, and I have to play within
those rules.
Id. at 86-87 (italics omitted).
40. After insinuating that defense counsel was unfairly "trying to twist a witness," Singer
stated: "But, oh, they can twist questions ... they can sit up in their offices and devise ways to
pass counterfeit money; 'but don't let the Government touch me, that is unfair; please leave my
client alone."' Id. at 88 (italics omitted).
41. Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 260, 446 (recording one of Singer's sarcastic questions
to Berger relating to his immoral conduct with women which provoked laughter and caused the
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wrote the famous passage quoted above and added that given a jury's
trust in the prosecutor, "improper suggestions, insinuations, and,
especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much
weight against the accused when they should properly carry none." 42
Given the weakness of the proof of Berger's guilt, the Court had no
difficulty concluding that Singer's misconduct altered the playing field
and gave him an unfair and undeserved victory. The Court rejected the
Second Circuit's conclusory assertions that it would be "fantastic" to
find that Singer's misconduct prejudiced the verdict, and that the harm
from his misconduct was "scarcely detect[able]." The Court reviewed
Singer's misconduct by evaluating the seriousness of his misconduct,
the evidence of guilt's strength, and the trial judge's actions minimizing
the prejudice. This methodology, according to the Court, must assess
the "probability" of harm, rather than the "possibility" of harm; whether
the "cumulative effect [of the prosecutor's misconduct] upon the jury"
was "consequential," or whether an appellate court would be "justified
in assuming its nonexistence"; and whether the trial judge took "stem"
and "repressive" measures to blunt the impact of the prosecutor's
misconduct. 43 The Court found that Singer's misconduct was
"pronounced and persistent," rather than "slight or confined to a single
instance";" the case against Berger was "not strong" and in fact was
"weak"; 4 5 and the trial judge took only "mild judicial action" 46 against
Singer, rather than a forceful rebuke and the issuance of a strong
curative instruction. 47 Therefore, it was "highly probable" that the
misconduct prejudiced the jury.48
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Singer's misconduct
was extreme. He clearly overstepped the bounds of propriety and
fairness by misstating facts, assuming prejudicial facts not in evidence,
insinuating that witnesses said things they had not said, representing
that statements had been made to him personally without proof, and
making inflammatory remarks to the jury.
Singer's misconduct was indeed serious, but was it that different
from the conduct of prosecutors generally? A survey of the legal
judge's admonition, "[t]he people that laugh will go out," and Singer's reminder to the jurors of
that courtroom laughter in attempting to prod a reluctant defense witness to identify Berger).
42. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
43. Id. at 85, 89.
44. Id. at 89.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 85.
47. Id. at 89.
48. Id.
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landscape at the time suggests that Singer's misconduct was not
unusual. 49 Prosecutors were notorious for engaging in forensic
lawlessness, and commentators bemoaned its frequency and flagrancy.
Dean Roscoe Pound, for example, decried the "number of new trials for
grave misconduct of the public prosecutor" and the "abuse and
disregard of forensic propriety which threatens to become the staple in
American prosecutions." 50 Contemporary legal literature reflected
Pound's concern, with articles appearing in law journals and
mainstream periodicals containing titles such as Lawless Enforcement of
Law, 5 1 Improper Conduct of Prosecuting Attorneys,52 Remarks of
ProsecutingAttorney as Reversible Error,53 Improper Comment Before
Jury,5 4 Prejudicial Error in Trials for Homicide,5 5 Expression of
Opinion by Prosecuting Attorney to Jury,5 6 Appeals to Race Prejudice
by Counsel in Criminal Cases,57 Deception According to Law,58 and
Shall ProsecutorsConceal Facts?59

The most famous documentation of misconduct by prosecutors at the
time of Berger was contained in the 1931 Report by the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, popularly known as
the Wickersham Commission. 60 The fourteen-volume Report was the
first comprehensive study in U.S. history of virtually every part of the
criminal justice system. Although Prohibition appears to have been the
49. Although Berger was a criminal case, one of the Supreme Court's citations in Berger
indicates the Court's awareness that egregious courtroom misconduct was also committed by
lawyers in civil trials. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 313-15 (1929)
(describing the repeated mischaracterizations by respondents that the petitioner had claimed the
respondent had syphilis).
50. ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 187 (Transaction Publishers 1998)
(1930).
51. Editorial, Lawless Enforcement of Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 956 (1920).
52. R.F.H., ImproperConduct of ProsecutingAttorneys, 24 MICH. L. REV. 834 (1926).
53. J.W.K., Remarks of ProsecutingAttorney as Reversible Error,21 ILL. L. REV. 403 (1926).
54. S.E.V., Improper Comment Before Jury, 4 N.C. L. REV. 132 (1926).
55. M.L., PrejudicialErrorin Trialsfor Homicide, 2 TEMP. L.Q. 283 (1928).
56. Recent Important Decisions, Procedure-Expressionof Opinion by Prosecuting Attorney
to Jury, 25 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1926).
57. Beirne Stedman, Appeals to Race Prejudice by Counsel in Criminal Cases, 4 VA. L. REG.
241 (1918).
58. Morris L. Ernst, Deception According to Law, THE NATION, June 1, 1927, at 602.
59. Emory R. Buckner et al., Shall Prosecutors Conceal Facts?, THE NATION, June 8, 1927,
at 628.

60. The Commission was established in May 1929 when President Herbert Hoover appointed
George W. Wickersham to head the National Committee on Law Observance and Enforcement.
The eleven-member group was charged with identifying the causes of crime and making
recommendations for appropriate public policy. See WICKERSHAM COMM'N, http://law
.jrank.org/pages/ 11309/Wickersham-Commission.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
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major catalyst for the Commission's study, the Report broadened into a
massive critique of U.S. criminal justice, including chapters on the
causes and costs of crime, practices by law enforcement agencies, the
operation of the judicial system, the work of grand juries and trial juries,
sentencing practices, and issues involving immigration and deportation.
The Report's documentation of the police use of the "Third Degree"the infliction of pain, physical brutality, and torture on suspects in order
to extort confessions-was prominently featured in the landmark
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.61 The Supreme Court placed limits on
coercive police interrogation practices in the historic case.
Most relevant to Berger is the chapter in the Wickersham Report on
prosecutorial misconduct. Titled "Unfairness in Prosecutions," the
Report systematically documented widespread abuses by U.S.
prosecutors and the adverse impact of the misconduct on the
administration of criminal justice. 62 These unfair practices, according
to the Report, "create resentment against law and government" because
they are committed by the public prosecutor who is so centrally
"responsible for law observance." 63 Unlike the "Third Degree," such
abuses are not hidden but "occur in the publicity of the court room." 64
According to the Report, the adverse impact of a prosecutor's unfairness
is felt most acutely by the accused. The prosecutor's wrongful conduct
"easily engenders the dangerous feeling that a fair trial has been denied
because the defendant belongs to an unpopular group and that for
members of such a group justice through the courts is not to be
expected." 65 The accused also believes, justly, that the prosecutor has
behaved so "tyrannically and brutally" that it further alienates the
defendant from the community and causes him to leave prison a "bitter
enemy of society, more willing than before to continue a criminal
career." 66 A prosecutor's unfairness, according to the Report, may
compel an appellate court to reverse a defendant's conviction and
require a second trial in which a guilty man might be totally discharged
and escape just punishment had proper methods been used.67 Finally,

61.

384 U.S. 436, 445-48 (1966).

62. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. ET AL., UNFAIRNESS IN PROSECUTIONS: REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 263, 267-347 (1931)

(describing instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and making recommendations to address the
issue).
63. Id. at 268.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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perhaps the most serious consequence of a prosecutor's unfairness may
be "the conviction of the innocent." 68
The Report studied 600 cases from 1926-1930 in which a
prosecutor's misconduct had been brought to the attention of an
appellate court. 69 In two-thirds of these cases, the courts reversed the
conviction. In the remaining one-third, they affirmed the conviction
because the defendant's guilt was clear, the trial judge's instruction to
the jury cured the misconduct, or defense counsel failed to preserve the
issue by an appropriate objection. The Report also examined appellate
briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court and courts of last resort in eight states
for the same period, and found that unfairness by prosecutors was the
most frequent legal claim appearing in the briefs. The Report found that
the instances of unfairness that were identified in the appellate decisions
"form only a fraction of the total number occurring in the trial courts,"
and that "[t]here are no available statistics showing the number of
innocent persons who have been convicted because of unfair practices
but took no appeal." 70
The Report identified various types of misconduct by prosecutors.
The Report described some of the misconduct as attributable to a
prosecutor's carelessness, inadvertence, inadequate training, or the
"excitement" of a criminal trial, rather than to any deliberate attempt to
deprive a defendant of his legal rights. Employing the rhetoric of
sports, the Report described such instances of misconduct as being "in
the nature of offside plays." 7 1 A considerable proportion of the
decisions, however, depict prosecutorial misconduct that involved a
deliberate disregard of the defendant's rights, or inexcusable ignorance
of elementary principles of criminal justice, such as the use of
inadmissible evidence, attacks on the defendant's character, and
inflammatory argument about the defendant, his lawyer, and his
witnesses. Such misconduct, according to the Report, "resembles
slugging in the line." 72 One can safely assume the Supreme Court in
Berger shared this sentiment.
This legal environment of prosecutorial abuse occurred
simultaneously with the Hughes Court's expansion of the protections of
the Bill of Rights. This expansion included the Hughes Court's
revolutionizing the First Amendment by applying its protections to the
68. Id.

69. Id. at 269-320.
70. Id. at 270.
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id.
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states. Thus, in Stromberg v. California,73 the Court held that a state's
unlawful restriction of speech violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Near v. Minnesota, the Court held that a state's unlawful restriction of
the press violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 In DeJonge v. Oregon,
the Court held that a state's unlawful restriction of peaceful assembly
violated the Fourteenth Amendment,75 and in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
the Court held that a state's unlawful restriction of the free exercise of
religion violated the Fourteenth Amendment.7 6 The Court also
observed in the famous "Footnote Four" in United States v. Carolene
Products Co. that judicial deference to economic legislation would not
necessarily apply to legislation that violated individual liberties or
burdened racial minorities.7 7 It should not be surprising, therefore, that
a Court that was expanding the constitutional rights and liberties of
individuals and restraining the power of the legislative and executive
branches would review a case involving a prosecutor's flagrant abuse of
power.
The Hughes Court also invoked the Due Process Clause to enhance
protections for criminal defendants, especially for black defendants tried
in Southern courtrooms. Thus, in Powell v. Alabama,78 the infamous
"Scottsboro" case, the Court reversed the capital murder convictions of
seven indigent and uneducated youths for raping two young white
women on a freight train near Scottsboro, Alabama. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Sutherland, the author of Berger, found that the
defendants were denied meaningful legal representation and held that
due process required states to provide free legal counsel to poor persons
charged with capital crimes. 79 The Court said that an indigent
defendant facing a capital charge "requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him," and that to deny him the
right "would be little short of judicial murder."80 Also, during the same
term as Berger, the Court in Norris v. Alabama,8 1 and Patterson v.

Alabama,82 reversed the murder convictions of two Scottsboro
defendants after they had been re-indicted and re-tried, on the ground
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

283 U.S.
283 U.S.
299 U.S.
310 U.S.
304 U.S.
287 U.S.

359, 369 (1931).
697, 707 (1931).
353, 365 (1937).
296, 305 (1940).
144, 152-53 (1938).
45, 73 (1932).

79.

Id. at 49, 71.

80. Id. at 69, 72.
81. 294 U.S. 587, 596 (1935).
82. 294 U.S. 600, 607 (1935).
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that Alabama had systematically excluded African-Americans from the
grand jury and trial jury.
The Hughes Court also focused on the fairness and accuracy of the
adjudicatory process of criminal trials. In Mooney v. Holohan,83
decided the same term as Berger, the Court observed that a prosecutor's
"deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured" to obtain a conviction was "inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice." 84 Mooney would become one of the
foundational cases for the Court's subsequent false testimony and
suppression of evidence jurisprudence under Brady v. Maryland.85 In
Brown v. Mississippi, the Court vacated murder convictions against
three African-American men whose confessions were obtained by the
police through torture, including whippings and hanging from a tree,
and the prosecutor used these confessions at trial to obtain their
convictions. 86 "It would be difficult to conceive of methods more
revolting to the sense of justice," the Court wrote, than the methods
used by the police to extract the confessions.87
Mooney and Brown plainly reflected the Hughes Court's concern that
a prosecutor's overzealous conduct, including his use of tainted
evidence, might result in convicting an innocent person. Berger makes
this concern explicit, describing the prosecutor as a quasi-judicial
official whose obligation is to see "that justice shall be done" and whose
professional duty is to prevent "innocence [from] suffer[ing]" and "to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction."88 Berger interpreted the prosecutor's public functions to
include a negative and an affirmative duty. The negative duty enjoined
prosecutors to refrain from striking foul blows and using improper
methods to bring about a wrongful conviction. The affirmative duty
enjoined prosecutors to promote factually accurate verdicts so that
innocent persons do not suffer. Both of these duties arose when a
prosecutor used false evidence to produce a false conviction. 89
To be sure, Berger's announcement that a prosecutor's interest is not
to win a case but to ensure that "justice shall be done" was not the first
83. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
84. Id. at 112.
85. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that suppression of a confession
violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
87.

Id.

88. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
89. See id. (stating that a U.S. Attorney has the obligation to see that the guilty not escape nor
the innocent suffer).
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time this conception of the prosecutor's role was expressed, but it was
the most authoritative and eloquent pronouncement of this ideal. Courts
and commentators for many years had described the prosecutor as a
quasi-judicial official whose vast powers could be used both
beneficently and wickedly. 90 In describing a prosecutor's dual
obligations, the Berger Court recognized the relationship between a
prosecutor abdicating his role as a minister of justice and engaging in
wrongful conduct that could produce an erroneous conviction. The
Wickersham Report, as noted above, made the same connection in
recognizing that the most serious consequence of a prosecutor's
misconduct may be convicting an innocent person. 91
Although there were prominent dissenters, the question in 1935 of
whether innocent persons were convicted of crimes was neither abstract
nor hypothetical. 92 For example, the well-known study by Professor
Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent, published in 1932,

documented sixty-five cases of convictions of innocent defendants
drawn from a much larger number of erroneous criminal convictions of
innocent people. 93 The causes of the erroneous convictions varied,
Borchard found, with mistaken identifications and witness perjury being
the two most prominent causes. 94 A sizeable number of the erroneous
convictions were the result of "overzealousness" by prosecutors,
typically in neglecting to scrutinize more carefully the evidentiary
weakness in the case.95
Moreover, it is likely that the Hughes Court was aware of the public
outcry over the prosecution and conviction of anarchists Nicola Sacco
and Bartolomeo Vanzetti for the murders of a paymaster and his guard
in South Braintree, Massachusetts and the defendants' execution in
1927. Sacco and Vanzetti were prosecuted during the panic of the "Big
Red Scare," described as "an era of lawless and disorderly defense of
law and order, of unconstitutional defense of the Constitution," and a
90. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,

612 (1999) (citing several cases and commentary, Professor Green notes that the concept of a
prosecutor's duty to "seek justice" or "do justice" dates back well over a century).
91.

CHAFEE, supra note 62, at 268.

92. Learned Hand famously wrote that "[o]ur procedure has been always haunted by the ghost
of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream." United States v. Garsson, 291 F. Supp.
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
93. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Vii
(1932).
94. See id. at vi (stating that the causes of error included mistaken identification, erroneous
inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, perjury by witnesses, or some combination of the
three).

95. See id. at 380 (listing erroneous cases resulting from overzealous prosecutions).
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"reign of terror." 96 The Sacco-Vanzetti case became a cause cdlbre in
the United States and abroad, and there was considerable public
sentiment that the defendants were innocent and did not receive a fair
trial. 97 The concern in the Wickersham Report that a fair trial may be
denied to persons belonging to unpopular groups was a clear reference
to the Sacco-Vanzetti case. Although there has never been conclusive
proof of Sacco and Vanzetti's innocence, there is ample evidence that
the prosecutor's misconduct and the trial judge's bias destroyed the
defendants' ability to receive a fair trial.98
It is also likely that the Hughes Court's focus on the prosecutor's
duty to protect the innocent may have included a recognition that among
the "improper methods" used by prosecutors to convict innocent
defendants was the failure to reveal evidence that might exonerate the
accused. Although at the time of Berger a prosecutor's duty to provide
favorable evidence to a defendant was nonexistent, 99 the Berger Court
was aware that a prosecutor could obstruct the fact-finding process by
suppressing exculpatory evidence and presenting false testimony.
Indeed, the Court in Mooney v. Holohan, decided the same term as
Berger, assumed that a state murder conviction would violate due
process if the prosecutor allowed a key witness to give perjured
testimony without disclosing this fact. To be sure, none of the
innocence cases cited by Professor Borchard identify the nondisclosure
by the prosecutor of exculpatory evidence as a contributing factor; nor
does the Wickersham Report identify a prosecutor's failure to reveal
favorable evidence to the defense as one of the principal types of
unfairness. However, presumably neither Professor Borchard nor the
96.

FREDRICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY 40 (Perennial Classics 2000) (1931).

97. Id. at 74.
98.

See HERBERT B. EHRMANN, THE CASE THAT WILL NOT DIE: COMMONWEALTH VS. SACCO

AND VANZETT xiii (1969) (stating that a failure to try the defendants on honestly presented
evidence could not be undone); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND

VANZETTI (1927) (providing a brief overview of the voluminous case material in the SaccoVanzetti case).
99. See Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.

228, 242 (1964) ("A defendant has hardly had a fair trial if he has been denied the opportunity to
discover evidence or information crucial to his defense."). The principal means of disclosure at
the time of Berger was through informal exchanges of information or incidental discovery
through preliminary proceedings. Although pre-trial discovery in civil cases dramatically
expanded in the 1920s and 1940s, discovery in criminal cases was resisted on the ground that it
would facilitate perjury and harm potential witnesses. Some criminal courts at the time of Berger
appeared to have an inherent power "to compel the discovery of documents in furtherance of
justice." And Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional Ethics imposed on prosecutors an ethical
duty to disclose evidence that would exonerate the accused: "The suppression of facts or the
secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible." Infra note 101.
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authors of the Wickersham Report would have found it surprising that
some prosecutors at the time of Berger would have possessed evidence
in their files that exonerated the defendant but did not disclose that
evidence to the defense. In fact, it may be only because of the notoriety
of the case and the meticulous examination of the trial record by
supporters of Sacco and Vanzetti during the post-conviction litigation
that evidence was discovered that the prosecutor suppressed the
following: (1) an expert's report that would have contradicted the
prosecution's theory that the murder bullets came from Sacco's pistol;
and (2) evidence of the existence of several eyewitnesses whose
testimony would have excluded Vanzetti. 00
Also, there is little doubt that Justice Sutherland's articulation of the
special obligation of the prosecutor to ensure that "justice shall be done"
was influenced by then-Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
the American Bar Association, which stated: "The primary duty of a
lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible."' 0 The Berger Court must have understood Canon 5's
ethical proscription of a prosecutor's duty "to see that justice is done" as
requiring a prosecutor to temper his zeal to win a conviction to
minimize the risk that an innocent defendant will be convicted. And to
minimize that risk, a prosecutor under the prevailing ethical standard
was cautioned to disclose information to the defense that was capable of
establishing the defendant's innocence.
Finally, at the time of Berger, the process of appellate review of
errors that may have contributed to a criminal conviction was erratic
and unprincipled. The Berger Court may have seen the need to examine
what one critic called the "wayward course of harmless error" whereby
some appellate courts routinely held that trial errors, no matter how
trivial, raised a presumption of prejudice or called for automatic
reversal. 102 Berger implied that reviewing courts properly should
ignore errors that were "inconsequential" or had only a "possible," as
opposed to "probable," impact on the result. The Court sided with the
100. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 98, at 73-91 (describing "mass of new evidence"
discovered after the trial that was suppressed by the prosecution and could have exonerated the
defendants).
101. GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, JR., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND ITS ETHics 572-73 (2d ed. 1933).
102. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 13-17 (1970) (explaining

that courts feared invading the province of the jury and reversed decisions for the smallest of
errors until the enactment of the "harmless error" statutes).
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reformers of harmless error that reversals should not be based on "the
mere etiquette of trials" or the "minutiae of procedure." 103 Berger
applied the recently enacted federal harmless error statute to find that
the variance between the indictment and the proof was a harmless error
because it neither prejudiced the defendant nor surprised him. 104 By
contrast, the Court found that the prosecutor's misconduct was not
harmless; the misconduct, in the language of the harmless error statute,
did "affect the substantial rights of the [defendant]." According to the
Court, the prosecutor's misconduct was "pronounced and persistent,"
the evidence against the defendant was "weak," and the trial judge did
not take "stern and repressive measures" to correct the situation. "In
these circumstances," the Court said, "prejudice to the cause of the
accused is so highly probable that we are not justified in assuming its
nonexistence." 1 0 5
Although the Berger Court for the first time applied the harmless
error statute to a prosecutor's misconduct, its analysis was conclusory;
the Court did not establish meaningful standards to guide an appellate
court's discretion and judgment in the evaluation of misconduct. That
the prosecutor's misconduct in Berger caused injury to the defendant's
substantial rights was an easy call. However, it is far from clear that the
Court would have vacated the conviction if the proof of guilt had been
factually stronger and the trial judge had taken forceful actions to stop
the prosecutor. Presumably, under the Berger approach, if a prosecutor
committed extreme misconduct but the evidence of guilt was strong and
the trial judge issued curative instructions, the conviction likely would
have been upheld. But if the conviction was upheld, what does this say
about Berger's inspiring language? Was it intended to have any
substantive effect? Or was it merely employed in this run-of-the-mill
error-correction case as a rhetorical device to be incanted ritualistically
by courts and commentators as a reminder to prosecutors not to behave
badly?

103. See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (explaining that the Act was
intended to prevent trivial matters from touching the merits of a verdict); see also TRAYNOR,
supra note 102, at 14 (observing that "harmless error" statutes were enacted by the federal
government and many states to preserve judgments when an error did not deprive a party of rules
or procedures essential to a fair trial).
104. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1935). The then-existing statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 391, has been slightly modified and is codified in the federal rules. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52
("Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.").
105. Berger, 295 U.S. at 89.
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BERGER SINCE

The first Part of this Essay speculated on the reasons why the
Supreme Court may have chosen to review Berger.10 6 This Part
considers Berger's subsequent impact on law and ethics, and the special
place it occupies in today's legal and ethical culture. Berger is sui
generis. Berger is the most authoritative and eloquent description in
U.S. law of the role of the prosecutor in administering criminal justice.
It is not an overstatement to say that Berger has become a virtual
anthem to the prosecutor's duty not to win a case, but to ensure that
justice is done, to protect the innocent, and to refrain from striking foul
blows. When courts review serious misconduct by prosecutors, they
cite Berger; when defense lawyers accuse prosecutors of misconduct,
they cite Berger; when academics write about prosecutorial ethics, they
cite Berger; when bar associations promulgate ethical rules for
prosecutors, they cite Berger. And even when prosecutors describe
their professional obligations, they cite Berger as authority to strike
hard blows to convict the guilty.
Given Berger's current prominence, it is ironic that it attracted so
little attention in the years immediately following the decision.
Berger's description of the flagrant misconduct of the prosecutor and its
inspiring rhetoric about the proper use of prosecutorial power, however
hortatory, had no role in deterring and punishing misconduct by
prosecutors. It established no rule of law; it merely reiterated the
contemporary understanding of the prosecutor's role to seek justice.
Berger established no standards to guide prosecutors except for its
broad command to prosecutors not to strike the types of foul blows
committed by Singer. In view of its facts, and its ambiguous
recognition that prosecutors are allowed to strike hard blows to win
convictions, Berger could not serve as a meaningful precedent in those
instances where prosecutors engage in less overtly prejudicial conduct.
For these reasons, as well as the fact that it was a tumultuous period
for the Court and the nation, Berger received scant attention in the
mainstream press and legal journals, 107 and has been relegated to
106. As noted above, the Court may have been influenced by the widespread existence and
notoriety of prosecutorial misconduct, which undermined public confidence in the integrity of the
criminal justice system; its own commitment to protecting personal rights and freedoms, which
included protecting the rights of persons accused of crime from government overreaching; its
recognition of the vulnerability of the criminal justice system to serious errors that might result in
the conviction of an innocent person; and its interest in articulating a more principled basis for
appellate reversal of trial errors.
107. See Recent Decisions, Criminal Law-Misconduct of Attorneys During Trial-Possible

Remedies, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1044, 1044-47 (1936) (discussing Berger's implications on future
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footnote status by historians of the Court. Berger was not cited in
several accounts of the Court under Chief Justice Hughes,1 08 and
received only one brief reference in several biographies about and
testimonials to its author, Justice George Sutherland. 109 A search of
Justice Sutherland's papers in the Library of Congress found no
mention of the case. Moreover, Berger's immediate impact on the
development of federal substantive and procedural law appears to have
been marginal. To be sure, courts in the years immediately following
Berger did cite the case occasionally, mostly for its treatment of the
variance issue, and viewed that portion of the case dealing with the
prosecutor's misconduct as an afterthought.11 0 There is no indication
that Berger influenced the way prosecutors charged and proved
conspiracies, presented evidence at trial, or made arguments to the jury.
Nor is there any indication that Berger inspired bar associations or
disciplinary agencies to examine the conduct of prosecutors more
closely or promulgate new rules governing the conduct of prosecutors.
Academic discussion over the prosecutor's role as a "minister of
justice" was negligible. And Berger failed to clarify the standards for
appellate review of error and misconduct, and indeed may have added
to the confusion. 111
cases and professional ethics); Recent Criminal Cases, Improper Conduct of Prosecuting Attorney
as Ground for Reversal, 26 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 276, 276-78 (1935-1936)
(commenting that Berger represents a step toward curbing the unethical practices of attorneys);
High Court Scores FederalAttorney, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1935, at 15 (recapping briefly the
result in Berger).
108. See SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951)
(analyzing the contribution Hughes made to constitutional issues); Ross, supra note 5 (exploring
the "judicial revolution" in the context of the Hughes Court).
109. See HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS xii (1994) (not citing Berger but noting Sutherland's
"highest function as a judge was to articulate the principles of justice, and the requirements of the
American Constitution"); MEMORIALS OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 463 (1981)
(not citing Berger but noting Sutherland's concern over "encroachments of government on the
freedom of the individual [and] the perils of the oppressive exercise of governmental power");
JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 212 (1951)
(reproducing Sutherland's famous passage in Berger as reflective of Sutherland's "great concern
for the preservation of personal liberty," his "emphasis on the unequal nature of the struggle
waged by government and the individual," and his concern that "[w]ith all the resources of
society at its command, government was under an overwhelming obligation to proceed with the
utmost fairness and justice whoever the accused might be").
110. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 548 (1947) (applying variance and
harmless error to the conspiracy charge at issue); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 75657 (1946) (explaining that the true inquiry is whether a variance has affected the substantial rights
of the accused); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 91 (1944) (explaining that a conviction can
be reversed only upon a showing of injury to the "substantial rights" of the accused).
111. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 655-64 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the so-called "Berger doctrine" for harmless error was
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Tracking the course of criminal law and procedure since Berger
makes it even more ironic that Berger has attained jurisprudential
immortality. Berger's idealized depiction of the prosecutor as a
"minister of justice" who is duty-bound to protect the innocent and to
prevent miscarriages of justice scarcely coincides with the harsh reality
of post-Berger criminal prosecution. Observers who have studied
prosecutors' conduct since Berger have concluded that prosecutors
continue to engage in the same types of blatant misconduct as that
committed by Singer, and indeed, have found many new ways to hit
below the belt. 112 Empirical studies increasingly have documented
serious and pervasive misconduct by prosecutors.11 3 Courts since
Berger have continued to lament their inability to make prosecutors
play by the rules. 114 And with a few exceptions, there is little evidence
being misapplied by appellate courts in affirming convictions despite serious misconduct by
prosecutors).
112. See ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE 123-41 (2007) (discussing prosecutorial
misconduct and the abuse and discretion of power); BENNETr L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT 476-79 (2d ed. 2009-2010) [hereinafter GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT] (discussing prosecutorial misconduct as related to prosecutors' arguments to the
jury, which is "one of the most common contentions" with the conduct of prosecutors, and is the
primary type of misconduct committed by the prosecutor in Berger); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 24 (2d ed. 1999) (outlining the role of the prosecutor as trial
counsel, and suggesting that trial guidelines governing the prosecutorial function are "most
frequently violated by the prosecution").
113. See CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON REPORTING MISCONDUCT 3 (2007) (reporting a study of 2,130 cases over a ten-year period
raising claims of prosecutorial misconduct and finding misconduct in 443 cases, or 21%); JAMES
LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (noting that error rate in capital cases was 68% and that
prosecutorial misconduct accounted for 16% to 19% of reversible errors); Ken Armstrong &
Maurice Possley, Trial and Error:How ProsecutorsSacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10,
1999, at 3 (reporting a national study of 11,000 homicide convictions between 1963 and 1999 in
which 381 convictions were reversed for prosecutorial misconduct); Bill Moushey, Win at All
Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 24, 1998, http://www.post-gazette.com/win/day3_1a
.asp (reporting a study of over 1,500 cases nationwide during the past decade that found hundreds
of cases in which prosecutors intentionally concealed exculpatory evidence); Steve Weinberg,
Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutoris Cited for Misconduct?, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY 2 (2003) (analyzing 11,452 post-1970 convictions that appellate courts reviewed for
prosecutorial misconduct, and in which courts reversed 2,012 convictions for prosecutorial

misconduct).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting
court's previous criticism of widespread abuse of hearsay rule by Kansas U.S. Attorney's Office
and reminding prosecutors of Berger's injunction to prosecutors "not that it shall win a case but
that justice shall be done"); United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 61 n.l (1st Cir. 2002) ("It is
difficult to imagine a more fundamental error. We hope that we will not see this error again by
prosecutors in our circuit."); United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 127-28 (1st Cir.
2002) (expressing "impatience" with the office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Puerto
Rico because "[d]espite numerous warnings from panels of this Court, its prosecutors continue to
flout clear rules of ethical conduct in their zeal to secure convictions"); United States v. Pallais,
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that courts, lawmakers, or professional disciplinary agencies have
demonstrated a willingness or capacity to impose sanctions on
prosecutors for committing foul blows.11 5
Ironically, although criminal defendants' rights expanded after
Berger, the courts have shown an extraordinary deference to the
prosecutor's power and discretion. 116 Moreover, concern over the
prosecutor's contribution to the conviction of the innocent, which may
have seemed at the time of Berger to be more hypothetical than real, is a
far more pressing concern today given the increasing evidence that
innocent people are erroneously convicted. 117 Indeed, courts and
commentators increasingly recognize that prosecutors' improper
methods do contribute to wrongful convictions.118 Finally, despite
Berger's condemnation of the prosecutor's misconduct as prejudicial
error, courts and commentators realize that the harmless error rule may
even encourage prosecutors to commit foul blows in the rational
expectation that they will not be penalized.1 19
In the years immediately after, courts most often cited Berger for its
holding that a variance between the charge and the proof could be
harmless error, and for its conclusion that a prosecutor's misconduct
could be prejudicial error. 120 The courts cited Sutherland's now-famous
921 F.2d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1990) (expressing frustration at futility of repeated rebukes of
prosecutors); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1174 (2d Cir. 1981) (expressing
"frustration" at "unheeded condemnations" of prosecutors).
115. See John F. Terzano, Joyce A. McGee & Alanna D. Holt, Improving Prosecutorial
Accountability-A Policy Review, THE JUSTICE PROJECT 5 (2009), http://www.thejusticeproject

.org/wp-content/uploads/pr-improving-prosecutorial-accountability.pdf (describing prevalence of
prosecutorial misconduct and the absence of significant restraints on misconduct, and
recommending ways to improve accountability).
116. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PITr. L. REV. 393, 424-43 (1992)
(discussing increased insularity of prosecutors from judicial control).
117. As of September 10, 2010, there have been 258 DNA exonerations in the United States.
See Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www

.innocenceproject.org/Content/35 .php (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). For non-DNA exonerations,
see, e.g., Robbie Brown, Judges Free Inmate on Recommendation of Special Innocence Panel,

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, at A14 (noting that Gregory F. Taylor's exoneration by the North
Carolina Innocence Commission was the only one of its kind in the nation).
118. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (describing numerous instances of
prosecutorial misconduct that has directly led to the conviction of innocent persons).
119. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) ("Where a reviewing court can find
that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in
fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed."); Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless
Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 440 (1980) (arguing that

harmless error tempts prosecutors to use evidence or techniques they would otherwise avoid
because of potential appellate reversal).
120. See supra note 110 (discussing the issues of variance and prosecutorial misconduct, and
suggesting that the material issue is whether a variance has compromised the substantial rights of
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passage occasionally but infrequently. However, time has overtaken
Berger as a precedent for applying the harmless error rule to variances
between charge and proof. That holding was followed, distinguished,
and then overruled by the Court in Stirone v. United States, which held
that a variance between allegation and proof could not be harmless
error. 121 A defendant, according to Stirone, has a fundamental right to
be tried only on charges presented in the indictment. Rejecting
Berger's approach, the Court concluded that "[d]eprivation of such a
basic right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a
variance and then dismissed as harmless error."l 22
Moreover, Berger's framework to determine whether a verdict was
harmed by the prosecutor's misconduct produced ambiguous and often
unsatisfying results, particularly when the prosecutor's misconduct was
severe but the evidence of guilt was also strong. The Court applied its
harmless error approach to a prosecutor's misconduct in two cases
decided a few years after Berger. In Viereck v. United States, citing

Berger, the Court reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecutor's
patriotic tirade against the defendant in the summation caused
substantial prejudice. 123 The prosecutor's remarks, said the Court, were
"highly prejudicial and . .. offensive to the dignity and good order with

which all proceedings in court should be conducted." 1 24 In United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., by contrast, the Court affirmed the

conviction, finding that the prosecutor's "undignified and intemperate"
appeal to class prejudice involved isolated and incidental statements
during a long trial.125 Distinguishing Berger, the Court noted that the
case was not weak, the prosecutor's misconduct did not permeate the
trial, the defense did not object, and the trial judge gave the jury a
curative instruction. 126 Although Viereck and Socony Oil are consistent
with Berger, they did not clarify the harmless error rule's application to
Indeed, courts after Berger
prosecutorial misconduct generally.
routinely upheld convictions notwithstanding serious misconduct by
prosecutors. Critics claimed this result had the unfortunate systemic
consequence of conveying to prosecutors the tacit message that if the
proof of guilt was strong, the prosecutor could strike foul blows with
the accused).
121. 361 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1960) ("[A]fter an indictment has been returned its charges may
not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself.").
122. Id. at 217.
123. 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1943).
124. Id.
125. 310 U.S. 150, 239-40 (1940).
126. Id. at 239-42.
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impunity. Also, by issuing a ritualistic "verbal spanking" to the
prosecutor but not imposing any penalty, the appellate court "breeds a
deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary." 27
Berger's exhortation to prosecutors to seek justice was an abstract
concept until Jencks v. United States,128 decided in 1957. In the case
that embodies the familiar "Jencks Rule" in criminal procedure,1 29 the
Court gave meaning to Berger's command that the government's
interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done" for
the first time. The Court used its supervisory power to hold that federal
prosecutors must disclose to the defendant any written reports of
government witnesses for inspection and possible use to discredit these
witnesses. "Justice requires no less," the Court said, citing Berger and
Canon 5 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics-at the time the
exclusive ethical rule governing the conduct of prosecutors. 130 The
Court emphatically rejected the government's self-serving plea that
protection of the government's confidential files should override public
disclosure. The government's duty is "to see that justice is done," the
Court responded, and it would be "unconscionable to allow [the
government] to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental
privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to
his defense." 131
Jencks is a tipping point in the evolution of Berger from a relatively
obscure decision to a case that thereafter increasingly dominates legal
and ethical discourse over the prosecutor's role. In the decades since
Jencks, Sutherland's passage has been cited with increasing
frequency.1 32 For example, Berger was cited in law reviews roughly
100 times from 1960 through 1980, nearly 300 times in the 1990s, and
close to 500 times in the last decade, often by commentators who have
written about the meaning of Berger's exhortation to prosecutors to "do
justice."133 Similarly, citation to Berger in appellate briefs has
127. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
128. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
129. Jencks has been codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3500, commonly referred to as the "Jencks Act."
130. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 668, 669 n. 13.
131.

Id. at 671.

132. Although "citation-tracking" admittedly may be an inexact measurement, it does provide
some basis to assess the influence of a case, especially as it reinforces impressions gained from
hands-on research and review of the legal literature.
133. Among the many contemporary articles focusing on Berger's exhortation to prosecutors
to "do justice," see Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and
Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHIcS 1301 (1996); R. Michael Cassidy, Character
and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek
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increased, from nearly 2,000 times in the 1990s to well over 3,000 times
in the past decade. Berger's injunction to seek justice and refrain from
striking foul blows has been cited in codes of professional ethics, 134
professional ethics treatises,135 and bar association proposals for
criminal justice reform. 136
Decisions that refer to Berger's "do justice" command often involve
prosecutorial misconduct that resembles the prosecutor's conduct in
Jencks-failure to reveal evidence to the defense that might assist in the
search for the truth. 137 Since Jencks, Berger has been routinely cited as
the authority for the prosecutor's legal and ethical duty to disclose.
Indeed, review of cases in which courts have cited Berger's command
suggests that one of the central meanings of Berger is the prosecutor's
obligation to promote fact-finding accuracy and refrain from conduct
that skews the adjudicatory process. Indeed, Jencks presaged the
Court's landmark ruling eight years later in Brady v. Maryland, in
which the Court for the first time imposed on prosecutors a
constitutional-rather than a statutory-duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence to defendants. 138 Mirroring the language in Berger, the Court
Justice," 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635 (2006); Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn't
Enough: Reinventing the Guidelinesfor ProsecutorialDiscretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475
(2007); Green, supra note 90; Samuel J. Levine, Taking ProsecutorialEthics Seriously: A
Consideration of the Prosecutor's Ethical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative
Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337 (2004); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as
Minister of Justice: Preachingto the Unconvertedfrom the Post-ConvictionPulpit, 84 WASH L.
REV. 35 (2009); Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors "DoingJustice" Through Osmosis-Reminders
to Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67 (2008); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 45 (1991).
134. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE

FUNCTION

§ 3-5.8 (3d ed. 1993) (pertaining to a prosecutor's argument to the jury).

135. See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 94 (2005) (describing instances of
prosecutorial overreaching and a prosecutor's duty "to ensure a level playing field"); JOHN JAY
DOUGLASS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 16-21 (1988) (explaining how the standard of
conduct for prosecutors has been compacted into Berger's famous quotes); PETER A. JOY &
KEVIN MCMUNIGAL, Do No WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDERS 5-7 (2009)
(describing Berger and the way it has been incorporated in Model Rules not just for prosecutors,
but for all lawyers).
136. See AD Hoc COMM. TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE
GUILTY xxvii (Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) (incorporating the text of Berger into
the practice of prosecution).
137. In Jencks, the evidence included prior statements of witnesses that could be used to
discredit their testimony. By refusing to disclose the statements, the prosecutor took advantage of
the defendant's ignorance of the content of the statements and engaged in adversarial unfairness
by requiring a litigant to establish the relevance of evidence about which only the adverse party is
aware.

138. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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in Brady wrote that "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly."l 39
Brady did not cite Berger. Nevertheless, it is impossible to read
Brady without believing that Berger heavily influenced that decision. 140
The Court may have chosen not to cite Berger because the prosecutor in
Brady either did not strike a foul blow or deliberately seek to subvert
the fact-finding process. Indeed, there was ample evidence that Brady
was guilty of capital murder, and he conceded as much. He argued that
he should not have been sentenced to death because his accomplice did
the actual shooting, and there was an isolated statement in the
prosecutor's files-that the prosecutor inadvertently failed to turn over
to Brady's lawyer despite his request-in which the accomplice
admitted the killing. In establishing the now well-known Brady Rule,
the Court made clear that intentional prosecutorial misconduct is not
required to establish a Brady violation. 141
Despite this, Berger is cited in virtually every important post-Brady
decision of the Court involving a prosecutor's nondisclosure of
exculpatory evidence. 142 Further, Berger and Brady are cited in tandem
for the principle that a prosecutor who suppresses exculpatory evidence
violates not only his constitutional due process duty but also his ethical
duty to ensure "that justice shall be done."143 And to the extent that

139. Id.
140. The Court in Brady described the prosecutor as the "architect" of the proceeding with the
power to "shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant." Id. at 88.
141. Id. at 87 (finding that suppression of material evidence violates due process "irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"). This point was reinforced in United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976), the Court's most important post-Brady decision in which it,
citing Berger, emphasized that the prosecutor's constitutional duty under Brady is not measured
by the "moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor."
142. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 1782 (2009) (stating that it is the
prosecutor's duty to ensure "that justice shall be done" and "to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction"); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694, 696 (2004)
(noting that it is "appropriate for [defendant] to assume that his prosecutors would not stoop to
improper litigation conduct to advance prospects for gaining a conviction"; and emphasizing the
"special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials" and the
prosecutor's duty "to refrain from improper methods to secure a conviction"); Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (stating that a prosecutor's interest "is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done"); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (emphasizing that a
prosecutor's interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done"); United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (stating that a prosecutor's interest "is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done"); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 (noting that a prosecutor is a
"servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer").
143. See Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1772 (stating that by suppressing material evidence relating "to
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courts and commentators increasingly have recognized a relationship
between a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and the
wrongful conviction of the innocent, Brady and Berger represent the
legal and ethical lodestars that a prosecutor is obliged to follow.144 The
cases that link the Brady duty with Berger emphasize the special role
the prosecutor plays in the search for truth. 145
Since Brady, the visibility of prosecutors in law and culture has
increased, misconduct by prosecutors has become more transparent, and
Berger's rise to fame has paralleled that trajectory. Citing Berger, one
of the Court's opinions observed that "[1]ike the Hydra slain by
Hercules, prosecutorial misconduct has many heads." 1 46 That opinion
proceeded to enumerate the many types of post-Berger "foul blows"
that prosecutors commit, some old and some new. It would be
impossible to list compactly and comprehensively these new types of
foul blows. Suffice it to say that foul blows today not only embrace the
misconduct in Berger and the conduct condemned in the Wickersham
Report-presenting inadmissible evidence, assassinating the character
of the defendant, abusing witnesses, becoming an unsworn witness, and
making inflammatory and other improper remarks to the jury-but also
misconduct that Berger neither addressed nor even contemplated,
including various types of grand jury abuses, breaches of guilty-plea
agreements, instituting criminal charges in bad faith, unconstitutional
selections of petit and grand juries, violations of rules of discovery and
disclosure, interfering with the attorney-client representation, and
refusing to investigate claims of innocence.
Moreover, as the courts continue to recognize new rights of criminal
defendants, prosecutors continue to devise new and improper ways to
guilt or to punishment" of the accused, a prosecutor violates the defendant's rights to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (describing the high standard of conduct to which the prosecution is held in criminal
trials).
144. See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D. Mass. 2009) ("[I]n response to a
disturbing number of wrongful convictions resulting in death sentences, in 2002 the Illinois
Commission on Capital Punishment recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court 'adopt a rule
defining 'exculpatory evidence' in order to provide guidance to counsel in making appropriate
disclosures."'); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685,
688 n.18 (2006) (listing several cases in which a prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory
evidence contributed to the conviction of innocent persons); Weinberg, supra note 113 (noting
that in twenty-eight cases involving thirty-two defendants, misconduct by prosecutors, including
suppression of exculpatory evidence, led to the conviction of innocent persons).
145. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 696 ("We have several times underscored the 'special role played
by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials."').
146. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 60 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing some of the many methods of prosecutorial misconduct).
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impair the exercise of those rights. 147 Some of this misconduct is
blatant and easily characterized as "foul." Other misconduct might have
been characterized by Berger as taking "cheap shots" at the defendant
indirectly and less blatantly. For example, although prosecutors are
enjoined from making direct comments on a defendant's exercise of his
right to remain silent, prosecutors have devised numerous ways to refer
to a defendant's silence less overtly. Prosecutors have also found ways
to burden a defendant's exercise of other constitutional rights that either
escape judicial censure entirely or might be found to be harmless error.
Prosecutors have found new ways to subvert the rules of evidence and
to introduce inadmissible evidence indirectly under the guise of some
feigned legitimate purpose. Prosecutors also have created charades to
mask deals with cooperating witnesses in order to prevent exposure of
the agreement through cross-examination. Prosecutors have devised
other schemes and tactics to prevent the accused from gaining access to
exculpatory evidence. Prosecutors have also used their control of
experts to introduce outlandish opinions, distort the facts, and mislead
the jury. Courts might disagree on the extent of the prejudice, as the
Second Circuit and Supreme Court disagreed in Berger, but likely
would find the above conduct not only to be antithetical to the
prosecutor's duty "that justice shall be done" but also to involve
"improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction."1 48
IV.

AFTERTHOUGHTS

Reflecting on Berger v. United States seventy-five years later, one is

struck by the dissonance between Berger's clarion call to prosecutors to
play fairly and by the rules, and the reality of prosecutorial practice
today. Perhaps the Berger Court was simply naive and, like society
generally, the criminal justice system has become less idealistic with
age. Hundreds of cases each year describe conduct by prosecutors that
any reasonable observer would characterize as "foul" and inconsistent
with the promotion of justice. Some critics have accused prosecutors of
"running amok."1 49 Courts reverse some of these cases; editorial

147. See, e.g., GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 112, at 497-506
(discussing various rights afforded to criminal defendants and the ways in which prosecutors have
violated these rights).
148. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
149. See Scott Horton, Remarks for a Luncheon of the New York Rotary Club and the
American Constitution Society (May 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.harpers.org/
medialimage/blogs/misc/remarks-for-a-luncheon of the rotary-cluband-american constitutio
nsociety.pdf) (suggesting remedial steps to stop prosecutorial abuse). Several federal district
judges have excoriated federal prosecutors recently for serious misconduct. See United States v.
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writers occasionally chastise some of these prosecutors; and academics
continue to bemoan the sorry state of criminal justice, the inability of
prosecutors to behave properly, and the failure of courts, lawmakers,
and disciplinary bodies to make prosecutors accountable. Berger seems
like a brooding omnipresence when prosecutors are accused of
misconduct; it is routinely cited but largely ignored.
Berger's transformation from a relatively obscure decision seventyfive years ago to a case of lasting meaning is curious. To be sure,
Berger's meaning has not changed; it is the legal system that has
changed, and most notably the prosecutor. The changed role of the
prosecutor appears to have brought a new awareness of Berger's
relevance. Given the prosecutor's increasing domination of criminal
law, his unilateral control of proof, his virtually unfettered power to
charge, bargain, and give immunity, and the deference given to his hard
blows to convict guilty people, it is hardly surprising that Berger's
rhetoric would be summoned, however wistfully, to express an ideal of
justice, but would be too weak to be a meaningful limit. As with so
much of the Court's other misplaced rhetoric-"wall of separation,"
"captive audience," and "marketplace of ideas"-Berger'slofty rhetoric
about the role of the prosecutor is incapable of influencing the
continuing ability of prosecutors to strike foul blows and escape
accountability. Seventy-five years later, Berger is honored more for its
grand message than in its observance.

Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (characterizing prosecutorial misconduct
as "disturbing" and "troubling" and imposing sanctions); United States v. Jones, 609 F. Supp. 2d
113, 119 (D. Mass. 2009) ("The egregious failure of the government to disclose plainly material
exculpatory evidence extends a dismal history of intentional and inadvertent violations of the
government's duties."); United States v. W.R. Grace, No. 05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. Apr. 28,
2009) (finding that prosecutors committed "clear and admitted violations" of federal law that
manifests "a systemic problem" in the Department of Justice); Transcript of Record at 5195,
5198, 5202, United States v. Ruehle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117895 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009)
(No. SACR 08-139-CJC) (finding that prosecutors "intimidated and improperly influenced"
witnesses and engaged in other "wrongful acts," and quoting the famous passage from Berger
noting its "sincere[] regret that the government did not heed the righteous words of the Supreme
Court"); Transcript of Record at 3, United States v. Stevens, 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7,
2009) (No. 08-231) ("In nearly 25 years on the bench, I've never seen anything approaching the
mishandling and misconduct that I've seen in this case."). The Deputy Attorney General in the
Department of Justice, on January 4, 2010, in response to these and other cases in which courts
found Department of Justice prosecutors to have committed serious violations, issued a detailed
memorandum to provide guidance to prosecutors with respect to their discovery and disclosure
obligations. The memo quoted Sutherland's famous passage in Berger. See Memorandum from
David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Dep't of Justice Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo.html (regarding "Issuance of Guidance and Summary of
Actions Taken in Response to the Report of the Department of Justice Criminal Discovery and
Case Management Working Group").

